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2Abstract
We study the impact of team-based performance pay in a major UK government agency, the
public employment service. The scheme covered quantity and quality targets, measured with
varying degrees of precision. We use unique data from the agency’s performance
management system and personnel records, linked to local labour market data. We show that
on average the scheme had no significant effect but had a substantial positive effect in small
teams, fitting an explanation combining free riding and peer monitoring. We also show that
the impact was greater on better-measured quantity outcomes than quality outcomes. The
scheme was very cost effective in small offices.
Keywords: Incentives, Public Sector, Teams, Performance, Personnel Economics
JEL classification : J33, J45, D23.
3Governments employ a lot of people. The productivity of these workers, forming such a
substantial fraction of the labour force (15% in the US, more than are employed in
manufacturing at 13%) is therefore a major issue and many governments have an explicit
agenda of improving the efficiency of public service delivery. One method which has
received considerable attention is the use of explicit financial incentives. Early examples
include Osborne and Gaebler (1993) “Reinventing Government”, promoted by Vice-
President Gore in the USA and the Job Partnership Agency Scheme in the USA in the 1980s
(Barnow 2000, Heckman et al. 1996). More recently, there has been considerable interest in
the use of performance related pay for teachers and public sector doctors and for outsourced
firms providing services to the public sector (e.g. Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011,
Lavy 2009, Gravelle et al. 2010).
1
Theorists have addressed the role of such incentives in the public sector, drawing attention to
a set of features such as multiple tasks, multiple principals and missions. All of these suggest
that even if there is no difference in the inputs of the production process between the private
and public sector, there are some specific features related to outputs and to the way public
sector agencies are structured which mean that incentives might be expected to have different
consequences in public organisations (e.g. Dixit 2002, Prendergast 1999, Baker 2002,
Francois 2000, Besley and Ghatak 2005). However, despite the interest (Burgess and Ratto
2003), the empirical evidence on the use of incentives in the public sector is still quite scant
and a recent review concluded that there are relatively few estimates from which causal
inferences can be made (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010).
This paper aims to fill this gap. In a search for greater public sector productivity, the
government of the UK in the late 1990s set up a series of experiments into the use of financial
incentives for lower level bureaucrats. As part of this programme they introduced an
experiment in the use of team-based financial incentives in a large UK public agency. This
agency, Jobcentre Plus, was one of the main government agencies dealing with the public and
its role was to place the unemployed into jobs and administer welfare benefits. In contrast
with many schemes in the private sector, the incentive scheme we analyse was exogenously
imposed on the organisation as part of a wider government experiment with incentive pay
(Makinson 2000). In addition, it was a team based performance pay scheme: workers were
1
For example, in 2011 The UK government made payment- by-results a key part of its payment arrangements
for private and not-for-profit firms for placing the long-term unemployed in work.
4rewarded on the basis of team rather than individual production. If the team hit the targets set
then all members of the team would receive the bonus payment.
We exploit this pilot to examine three key issues in the use of performance related pay in the
public sector. First, what is the impact of an explicit financial incentive scheme on public
sector workers? Dixit’s (2002) review of theoretical contributions suggests that such
incentives may be counter-productive. Evidence on the effectiveness of incentive schemes in
the public sector is mixed. Kahn, Silva and Ziliak (2001) examine a reform to the Brazilian
tax collection authority which paid financial incentives based on individual and team
performance in detecting and fining tax evaders. Amounts involved were substantial,
frequently providing bonuses over twice mean annual salary. Authors find a dramatic effect,
with fine collections per inspection 75% higher than in the counter-factual. Lavy (2009)
found that teacher incentives to improve pupil performance in maths and English in Israel
significantly raised student outcomes. Baiker and Jacobson (2007) in a study of the police
where participants were able to keep a proportion of the value of drug-related asset seizes
found significant effect of the incentives, documenting an increase in heroin related drug
offenses and even a rise in the price of heroin. Gertler and Vermeersch (2012) found
improved child health outcomes from incentives to health workers in Rwanda to offer more
and better quality of prenatal and postnatal care. But counter-examples exist – for example
Mullen et al. (2010) found little effect of pay for performance on the quality of medical care.
Second, what is the impact of the team basis of the scheme? Economists have typically been
skeptical of a team basis for obvious free-rider problems; such free rider effects have been
found for example in Gaynor and Pauly (1990), Gaynor et al. (2004) and Bhattacherjee
(2005).
2
On the other hand, Burgess et al. (2010) find that even in quite large teams, a team-
based incentive scheme in the UK Customs and Excise raised the productivity of agency
workers. Knez and Simester (2001) argue that peer monitoring outweighed free-riding effects
in a scheme in Continental Airlines which had large teams and Hamilton, Nickerson and
Owan (2003) conclude similarly for a garment factory in California. In an experimental
setting, Carpenter (2007) and Abbink et al. (2006) find the relationship between group size
and productivity to be dependent upon the design, for example the transparency of effort
contributions. Ghatak et al. (1999) find that whilst in general smaller groups are favored for
2
Holmström (1982) provides the formalisation.
5joint liability programs in developing countries, how well group members know each other
and interact are important. The incentive scheme we analyze was introduced across teams of
very different structures, allowing us to quantify the effect of team size.
Third, how do workers respond to relative task measurement precision in an explicitly multi-
tasking environment? Although the implications of multi-tasking for scheme design are a
major part of the theoretical literature on incentives, there is very little empirical evidence on
the importance of the precision with which targeted outcomes are measured (though see
Gaynor and Pauly, 1990). The incentive scheme we study here incorporated five targets
covering most of the tasks of the agency, though only four of these were measured. One was
defined in terms of quantity of output and was measured with considerable precision as it was
a weighted count of every client placed in a job. Three were defined in terms of quality and
were measured with considerably less precision. We may therefore expect to find a greater
impact on the quantity outcomes. On the other hand including targets for quality, albeit
measured imprecisely, may prevent the decline in quality often associated with incentive
schemes targeting quantity.
3
The scheme was piloted in a small number of districts and we exploit plausibly exogenous
assignment of treatment status for identification. The process by which some offices were
given performance pay and others not is obviously key so we describe it in some detail. There
were two unconnected events which generated a treated group. First, a small number of local
offices were chosen to be a new kind of office (named Pathfinder offices). These were
changed to offer a combined service of placing people into work and administering benefits,
and were also given new IT systems to manage this. The Pathfinder offices were selected to
be representative in terms of size and the level of urbanisation of their location, variables
which we observe in the data. Clearly, the choice of offices to become Pathfinders was not
random. Second, when the performance pay pilot was being set up, it was decided to
introduce the incentive scheme in all offices in districts which had a Pathfinder office. Our
analysis uses only non-Pathfinder offices. Our identification of a causal effect is therefore
possible because for non-Pathfinder offices, whether they are selected for treatment or not is
independent of their own characteristics. That is, their treatment status is exogenous. Ideally,
we would want to run a difference-in-difference analysis but this is impossible. We only have
3
See Paarsch and Shearer (2000) for an analysis of this issue.
6data for the year that the scheme was in operation; consistent data for the year before simply
does not exist as some district boundaries were re-drawn. We undertake propensity score
matching to compare the incentivized offices with the most-alike non-incentivized offices.
We find no significant overall impact of the scheme. However, we do find significant
heterogeneity of response that fits with free rider effects and the feasibility of peer monitoring
in production. The impact of the incentive scheme was positive, substantial and significant in
small offices and negligible in large offices. Thus while some mechanism such as peer
monitoring does overcome the free-riding problem in small teams, it appears not to do so in
large teams. Finally, whilst quantity increased, introducing multiple targets ensured there was
no subsequent decline in the quality of service. Factors such as less precise measurement and
poorer monitoring technology of quality relative to quantity meant that the scheme did not
raise quality.
Section 1 describes the nature of the organisation and the incentive scheme and discusses the
theoretical issues that arise. Section 2 introduces the data, and sets out our modelling
framework and our identification strategy. Section 3 presents our estimation results. In
section 4 we use these estimates to evaluate the scheme. Section 5 concludes.
1. The Organisation and the Incentive Scheme
1.1 The Nature of the Incentive Scheme
The initial drive for the introduction of financial incentives was political, originating in the
White Paper “Modernising Government” (1999). This was followed up in the Makinson
report (2000) for the Public Sector Productivity Panel, advocating incentive schemes for front
line government workers. This study evaluates one of these schemes.
4
The pilot incentive
scheme at Jobcentre Plus (JP) ran from April 2002 to March 2003. The main relevant features
of the scheme are as follows.
4
Burgess et al. (2010) evaluate another, implemented in the UK tax collection agency (Her Majesty’s Custom
and Excise).
71.1.1 Teams
Jobcentre Plus was organized in 11 regions and 90 districts
5
. Performance targets and rewards
were assessed at the level of a district. A district contained a number of distinct offices, each
dealing with the population in their local area. The official rationale for designing a team-
based rather than an individual-based incentive scheme was to promote cooperation among
workers, but discussions with the scheme designers revealed that another reason was that
some of the output measures relating to the quality of the service provided by the agency are
only available at the aggregate level of districts (see also below)
6
.
All workers in the incentivized district got the bonus if the target was hit, including district
managers and the district manager was responsible for achieving the target. Thus the team
was defined on the basis of administrative structure rather than on the basis of a production
function.
7
The teams were large. There were between 5 and 39 offices in the team and from
264 to 1535 people within a team.
8
17 out of the 90 districts were incentivized. As noted in
the introduction, these were the districts containing at least one new type of office – the
‘Pathfinder’ office.
9
These districts were designated as “Pathfinder districts” and contained
both Pathfinder and non-Pathfinder offices. Non incentivized districts only contained non-
Pathfinder offices.
1.1.2 Threshold incentive payment
In common with many schemes, the incentive scheme was a step function, based on a pre-set
threshold level of performance. No workers were paid a bonus for performance below the
threshold, the bonus was paid to all for hitting the threshold, and then there was no further
increase in remuneration for further output. The bonus paid varied with the job grade and the
number of targets hit, with a minimum of two targets required. There was an additional bonus
for hitting all five targets. If all five targets were hit, a band A worker would earn an extra
5
See Table W1 in the Web Appendix for a list of all districts and regions of Jobcentre Plus in 2002.
6
It would have also been very hard to get union consent for the introduction of performance related pay based
on individual output.
7
There were few operational links between offices in a district and different offices were largely self-contained.
8
Knez and Simester (2001) analyse the impact of incentives within big teams.
9
These were offices that began to be introduced at the time when JP was launched in 2001, amalgamating the
functions of two agencies: the Benefits Agency (BA), responsible for administering benefits to the unemployed,
lone parents and others, and the Employment Service (ES), responsible for job placement. 56 new ‘Pathfinder’
offices were initially introduced to provide an integrated service, combining the work of the original, separate,
benefits offices and employment offices. This process of change was slow, and most offices at the time of our
study – there were 1464 in total – remained single service providers as ex-BA or ex-ES offices. More Pathfinder
offices were created throughout the year of the pilot scheme.
8£750, whereas a band G job would get £3,750 more
10
. This represented around 7.5 and 8.5
percent of average pay respectively. The threshold targets for the incentivized districts were
set as percentage increases on the previous year’s achievements.
11
1.1.3 Multiple targets
One central issue in the design of incentive structures is the importance of multi-tasking. In
particular, a trade-off between quantity produced and quality is often crucial. The scheme
design recognized this and included targets for five different functions, which together
measure quantity and quality. These were job placements (a measure of quantity), along with
four measures of quality: customer service, employer service, “other business delivery
functions”, and reducing benefit calculation error and fraud. However, the specific activities
involved, and the ease with which each target was measured, differed widely across the five
targets. As workers will have to choose how to allocate their effort, the measurement of each
target variable will affect the allocation of this effort.
The quantity measure, job placements (called job entries in the agency) were measured as
weighted numbers of clients who were found work by the office. The weight per placement
varied with the priority of the clients and reflected government targets (see Table W3 in the
Web Appendix for details). Our main quantity output measure is job entry point productivity,
defined as a simple ratio of total job entry points at office level divided by the number of
frontline staff at office level.
A second measure, the quality of service to job seekers (denoted JSQ, also referred to as
“customer service”) captured aspects of quality - speed, accuracy, pro-activity of service, and
the nature of the office environment
12
. It was measured by independent analysis of
questionnaires to employers and ‘mystery shopping’ techniques.
13
The “employer quality”
10
See Table W2 in the Web Appendix for more details on the actual bonus payments made to incentivized
districts.
11
All districts have clear targets set for all functions, but in the control districts these were not incentivized. The
terminology of JP describes these base goals as targets and the higher levels as ‘stretch’. In this paper we keep to
the standard economics terminology and describe the higher levels of output required to win the bonus as the
targets. See Table W7 for details of the incentive targets on each output measure.
12
See Table W4 in the Web Appendix for more details.
13
This consists of a quarterly programme, where the assessors used a variety of techniques to measure the
elements of the target. In particular, they went into offices and acted out the role of a customer, checking the
environment in which services were delivered and telephoned offices to see how quickly and effectively phone
calls were answered.
9target (EMQ) was a measure of whether and how quickly vacancies were filled
14
. This was
measured (again independently) by a survey of employers. The “business delivery” target
(BDT) covered a wide range of other functions, and appeared to be an attempt to measure
everything else that the offices did
15
. It was measured by checking samples of cases. The
final target, the “monetary value of fraud and error”, focused on two particular benefits –
Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance. This was measured by specialist teams visiting
each district and examining samples of cases. However, the measurement and tracking of this
particular target was obscure, all 17 Pathfinder districts were treated as a single virtual region
and reporting of progress on the target was well after the end of the pilot. Consequently the
target provided no scope for policy evaluation within the period covered by the data and we
ignore it here.
1.1.4 Hierarchy: measurement, reward and production.
A final relevant characteristic of the scheme was that targets were measured at different
levels of the agency hierarchy. Job entries were measured monthly at office level. The three
quality measures we examine, JSQ, EMQ and BDT, were measured quarterly at district level.
1.2 Theoretical Issues
While incentive schemes can impact on the selection of workers into organisations (for
example, Lazear 2001, Dixit 2002, Besley and Ghatak 2003, 2005, Bandiera et al. 2011), the
timescale of the pilot and the relatively low staff turnover we observe in the data suggest that,
in this context, the main effects will come through changes in the behaviour of incumbent
workers.
1.2.1 Structure and size of teams
An important characteristic of the scheme was the structure of the teams. These were defined
at the level of a district and were made up of a number of offices with no operational link
with each other. In our context, a classic Holmström (1982) team would be at the office level
where workers depend on each other to produce output. But teams were defined by
administrative boundaries (the districts), chosen as the units of measurement for targets and
performance. This created interdependencies among the offices in a district. The expected
14
See Table W5 in the Web Appendix for more details.
15
See Table W6 in the Web Appendix for more details.
10
reward for effort in an incentivized office depended on performance at district level and this
was determined by the output of all offices belonging to the same district. But production
occurred at office level. Hence the structure of the scheme resulted in a two-level team:
“natural” teams (offices) within reward teams (districts). At the level of an office, the fact
that individual contributions to office output were not separately observable (as only a
measure of the office output was available) creates an externality, similar to that of
Holmström (1982) when output is fully shared among team members whose contributions are
not separately observable and consequently the number of team members becomes crucial for
the delivery of optimal incentives. In large teams the free-riding problem is more
complicated to tackle with the use of group penalties/bonuses alone. Monitoring
performance is also required. Peer pressure within an office - where colleagues are able to
observe each other – could alleviate free rider problems but is more likely to be effective in
small offices.
16
In our context we have possible free-riding within an office and within a district
17
. It is not
possible to identify the latter because we drop the PF offices for identification and in larger
districts there tended to be more PF offices; thus this mechanical effect is confounded with
any potential free-riding effect. Consequently our analysis of team size effects focuses on the
office size effect (staff per office)
18
. We expect that offices with relatively fewer staff
should perform better, as the free-riding issue is easier to tackle and peer pressure may be
stronger.
1.2.2 Multi-tasking and the Measurement Technology
The main quantity target, job entry productivity, was measured most precisely and directly
from the management information database, at office level, monthly. By contrast, the quality
of service to job-seekers and employers were measured through a sample survey and a
sample of cases, only at district level and only on a quarterly basis and contained an element
of subjectivity. This greater level of aggregation over both time and space and increased
uncertainty from the subjective element of assessment gives a noisier measure of how a
16
Kandel and Lazear (1992) show that peer pressure can offset free-riding tendencies, but the strength of this
peer pressure varies with unit size, with more effective monitoring in small units. Knez and Simester (2001) find
evidence that free-riding can be reduced in large teams through team design.
17
Ratto et al. (2010) provide a theoretical analysis of the different effects of size of office in the context of sub-
teams operating within a larger team, where the reward is at the larger team level.
18
We control for district size (number of offices per district) but it cannot be interpreted in terms of free-riding
11
worker’s effort maps into output on these tasks. The enforcement of effort levels is even more
difficult for the tasks measured at district level. When performance outcomes are low the
district manager does not know which office is under-performing, making the coordination
and monitoring more difficult and therefore free-riding across offices harder to tackle.
We can illustrate the optimal response of an employee given the reward structure and
measurement technology in a simple framework
19
. Suppose an employee i produces output
x(ai) depending on her effort level a. The output of each employee is sampled with
probability p, and a performance measure is produced by averaging across N individuals. For
simplicity assume that this aggregate indicator is measured with noise, denoted by ߳. The
target level t is hit when ሺσ ݌ݔ(ܽ௜)௜ ܰΤ ሻ+ ߳ ൒ ݐ and the probability of achieving the target is
therefore ܨ൫ሺσ ݌ݔ(ܽ݅)݅ ܰΤ ሻ െ ݐ൯. The marginal effect of worker i’s effort on the probability of
achieving the target is ݂൫ሺσ ݌ݔ(ܽ݅)݅ ܰΤ ሻ െ ݐ൯. ݌ ܰΤ where f is the density function of ߳.
Given that the rewards for hitting each target were the same and assuming no substantial
differences in effort costs across targets, this allows us to predict how workers would have
optimally focused their effort. We would expect more effort on the quantity target than the
quality targets because: every worker’s effort necessarily counted in the quantity target (p =
1) but only a sample was taken for quality (p < 1); the degree of aggregation of the
performance information is higher in quality (district) than quantity (office); and the noise to
signal ratio is lower in quantity measurement (high f in the neighbourhood of the target).
However as workers had to hit at least two targets to receive any bonus, they could not fully
neglect quality.
2. Data, Identification and Empirical Model
2.1 Data
We use data from JP’s management information system and personnel database. These data
were available only for the period of operation of the incentive scheme (April 2002-March
2003).
20
Management information recorded performance against the five targets. As noted
19
We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this way of illustrating the point.
20
It would obviously be very desirable to have data before the scheme was implemented to allow a difference-
in-difference technique. Unfortunately this did not exist: the district boundaries that defined the scheme were re-
drawn in 2002.
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above, Job entry productivity (JEP) achieved for each office on a monthly basis was the
measure of quantity and the three quality outcomes (JSQ, EMQ and BDT) were reported for
each district on a quarterly basis. A description of the data is provided in Table A1. It shows
wide variation in quantity (JEP) across offices and time with the standard deviation of a
similar magnitude to the mean but much less variation (and fewer observations) for the
sample-based measures of quality relative to their mean.
The main input is people. We obtained, from personnel records, the number of staff in each
grade for each office per month. The numbers in different grades appeared in more-or-less
fixed proportions. For example, there was about one Executive Officer (EO) to two
Administrative Officers (AO). Consequently, including numbers of each grade in the analysis
leads to severe multicollinearity. We therefore defined a measure of front-line staff which
was the office total of all workers in EO and AO grades.
21
For office level analysis we take
the office mean of frontline staff across time.
We merged unemployment and vacancy data from the local labour market as a control for the
difficulty of placing individuals in the labour market. Using the postcode (zip code) for each
JP office, we located each office in a Travel To Work Area (TTWA).
22
We then extracted
claimant inflow and vacancy inflow data for each TTWA and for each month.
23
We cannot
take the unemployment and vacancy stocks as exogenous as they are influenced by the
outflow rate, our dependent variable. So we use the inflow, both of unemployed claimants
and of vacancies, and take the latter divided by the former. The state of the labour market
plays two roles – first it provides the ‘raw material’ necessary for the office to produce job
entries and second, it proxies labour market tightness and hence the ease of placing claimants
in jobs. The office level mean labour market takes the average for each office over time.
Clearly the quality of the workers employed in the offices is an important consideration and
there is no reason to expect it to be constant across the country. Traditionally, public sector
jobs pay less than private sector jobs but variation in the differences between public and
private sector wages across the country will feed into quality variation. To adjust for quality
21
We have no information on the state of the capital (principally computing and communications equipment) in
offices.
22
These are largely self-contained local labour markets, defined by 75% of those living there also working
there, and 75% of those working there also living there. There are some 400 covering Britain.
23
National Online Manpower Information Service, http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/ .
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we merge data on the local private-public sector wage differential as a proxy for the different
quality of staff (see Nickell and Quintini 2002, Propper and Van Reenen 2010). From the
Labour Force Survey Small Areas dataset we constructed the wage gap between the private
sector and the public sector for each local authority using the difference in the hourly wage of
full-time workers in the private sector and the public sector, measured in GB pounds. This
was matched to the office postcode.
We know which offices were Pathfinder (PF) offices. They had to merge and deal with two
separate functions which had previously been undertaken in separate offices. JP estimated
that Pathfinder offices took at least five months to adjust, and even beyond the adjustment
period, Pathfinder offices fulfilled more roles than a typical office. Consequently we would
expect their productivity during the life of the pilot to be lower.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the annual job entry productivity across different office and
district types. Comparing offices in non-incentivized districts with non-PF offices in
incentivized districts is a like-with-like comparison and the distributions are fairly similar.
PF offices, on the other hand, clearly have lower mean job entry figures. As noted above, we
exclude PF offices from our main analysis
24
. Figure 2 presents the distribution of the quality
measures and shows higher attainment on the business delivery target, followed by employer
quality and finally job seeker service quality.
2.2 Identification Strategy
The pilot incentive scheme was introduced in all offices in the 17 districts with Pathfinder
(PF) offices, leaving all offices in the other 73 districts as controls. The choice of which
offices were to become PF offices was made by Field Directors and their District Managers
on the basis that their management would be able to cope well with the demands of the new
structure. PF offices were located across the regions, and the selected offices were to reflect a
“cross-section of different communities and customer bases, i.e. from large inner-city offices
24
We do include another kind of office that during the scheme became designated as pathfinder offices (called
Jobcentre Plus Offices). These became Pathfinders late in the time period of the pilot - 82% of these were not
designated as Pathfinder until the final two months of the scheme – and given this we expect them to have had
little disruption during the scheme. We test the robustness of this choice.
14
to those in smaller towns, suburbs and rural areas.”
25
Clearly PF status is likely to be
correlated with other inputs and outcomes.
Identification of a causal effect is possible because the treatment status of non-PF offices is
unrelated to their own characteristics. Among the set of all non-PF offices across the country,
some were given the incentive scheme and some were not, on a basis that was exogenous to
their own inputs and productivity. PF offices themselves are clearly not randomly selected
and they are omitted from the analysis.
One issue that might threaten identification would be the presence of important production
spill-overs between offices: if the presence of a PF office affected the performance of other
non-PF offices within the district, this would introduce bias. For example, a PF office may
have absorbed clients from neighboring offices, or absorbed resources from local offices. In
fact, the former is unlikely as roll out was quite disruptive and the latter also unlikely as the
intention was for all offices to become Pathfinder offices. So as Pathfinder status was
temporary there was little incentive to differentially shift clients or resources towards or away
from other offices in the Pathfinder districts.
2.3 Matching offices
Table 1 shows that incentivized districts are larger (425 compared to 268 on average), both
with more staff per office (32 compared to 27), and more offices (15 compared to 11).
incentivized This is driven by the presence of the PF office(s); once these are dropped, the
patterns are much more similar. They appear to face very similar labour market conditions.
In panel b) of Table 1, incentivized offices have slightly more staff (32 compared to 27) when
including PF offices but again, dropping these offices brings the mean office size of
incentivized offices to 25. Again, labour market tightness is similar across treatment status.
Comparing the variable for the private-public sector pay gap across treated and non-treated
groups, we see only small differences across office and districts with incentivized districts
excluding PF offices having slightly higher relative quality in the public sector but at office
level slightly lower.
To further ensure that our comparison of incentivized offices with non-incentivized offices
compares like-with-like we use propensity score matching to select our control offices. Even
25
Private communication.
15
though districts are the basis for assignment into the treated category, we compute propensity
scores at office level because offices are the unit of analysis. We include all non-PF offices in
incentivized districts and all offices in non-incentivized districts, giving 912 offices. We
estimate the conditional probability of assignment to incentivisation status based on a set of
observable variables. These variables might influence choice of pilot areas and/or the
outcome variables. We employ a nonparametric regression method with kernel weights
proportional to an Epanechnikov kernel and bootstrap to calculate the standard errors using
100 replications with replacement.
To justify that our identification strategy compares treated and control offices which are
similar in traits, other than assignment to the incentive scheme, the propensity score estimate
from the above probit is shown in Table A2. Our identification strategy requires dropping PF
offices from analysis. These offices are relatively large and therefore the consequence will
be to lower the average office size and district size (through excluding offices) in treated
teams and that is what we see in Table A2. The table indicates that it is important to ensure
that each treated office has a comparable control through propensity score matching. Note
that any difference in the private-public wage gap noted in Table 1 is insignificant in Table
A2. Table 2 shows the balance of variables used for matching, across the treatment and
control offices. Before matching, treatment and control means differ significantly in very
few variables - the propensity score, the labour market variance and the number of offices per
district. However, once we have implemented the matching technique, none of these
differences are significant and indeed for almost all variables there is no significant
difference between treatment and control. We therefore select the matching sample of 841
offices which were on common support for analysis.
2627
The evidence suggests that using
this sample, our identification strategy is valid.
2.4 Empirical Specification
We aim to answer three questions. First, is the productivity of public sector workers
influenced by financial incentives? Second, does free-riding matter in a team-based incentive
scheme? Third, does targeting quantity and quality prevent a decline in quality despite
differential measurement precision and poorer monitoring technology?
26
See Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997)
27
Table A3 details the estimation results from the propensity score matching.
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The outcomes we focus on are log job entry productivity as the quantity measure and the
quality of service to job seekers (denoted JSQ), the quality of service to firms (denoted EMQ)
and the business delivery target (denoted BDT) as the three quality measures.
We estimate the quantity measures at office level
ododdod ȕ;,6\ QJD  (1)
where y is log total job entry productivity in office o in district d, X is a set of covariates and
Q is random noise. Ȗ denotes the effect of incentivisation status (IS), our parameter of
interest. To test for the presence of free-riding within teams of the incentive scheme we
interact IS with the number of workers within an office. We allow the treatment effect to vary
flexibly across office size, by interacting IS with bins for office size, which compare the
bottom and top quartile of office size (12 and 37 respectively) to the middle half of the data.
We include an additional control for the interaction of IS with the number of offices per
district as large incentivized districts tended to include a larger number of PF offices, which
were excluded from analysis. Office level regressions cluster at the district level, given the
importance of the district manager to coordinate the activity of the offices in their district. We
also include regional fixed effects in all regressions.
We estimate the quality measures at district level:
dddd uZISy w KO (2)
\ ^-64(04%'7`ȜGHQRWHVWKHHIIHFWRILQFHQWLYLVDWLRQDQGu the error term. To test for
free-riding at the district level we interact IS with the number district staff. The controls (Z)
are aggregated to a district level. We control for the size of the districts through the total
number of staff in the district.
Our identification assumption for the office level analysis is:
E(yod|ISd=1,PFod=0,Xod)-E(yod|ISd=0,Xod Ȗ(Yod|ISd,Xod,PFod=0)=0
and is the same for district level analysis, with the office subscript omitted.
3. Results
We present results first for the quantity variable, testing to see whether the incentive scheme
had any effect on productivity and for evidence of free-riding. Next the effect of the scheme
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on quality measures is assessed, to examine whether the effect of the scheme changes across
outcomes measured with different precision.
3.1 Quantity – Job Entry Productivity
Table 3 presents the results for the log annual job entry productivity. This is for the sample of
offices producing job entries, PF offices are excluded and we include only offices on
common support in the matching. Standard errors are clustered at district level.
We present a number of different specifications for the effects of the incentive scheme along
with the office characteristics. We start with the effect of basic office characteristics in
column 1. Neither District Offices (which have central administrative functions) nor
“Jobcentre Plus” offices (which became PF offices at the end of the year) have different job
entry productivity from other offices. The main contextual variables have the expected signs
but are insignificant: a high private-public wage gap reduces productivity, and a strong local
labour market raises job entry productivity.
Column 2 introduces the incentive effect and shows an insignificant treatment effect on
average. Specifically, the coefficient 0.09 translates into an incentive effect of 30 job entry
points or approximately 5.6 people into employment per member of staff per year. Our
parameter of interest is the interaction between treatment and office size (the number of
staff). To control for the baseline productivity differences by the size of the office, Column 3
includes controls for a quadratic in mean frontline staff within an office, across time. Both
terms are statistically significant and indicate that job entry productivity declines with staff at
an increasing rate.
In an incentive scheme where performance is measured at a team level, the marginal return to
individual effort decreases in the team size, which raises the incentive to free ride. Column 4
tests for the presence of free-riding within offices, including an interaction between treatment
status and bins for office size. The omitted bin is for the middle half of the office size
distribution, compared to those in the lower quartile (less than 12 frontline staff, bin 1) and
those in the upper quartile (greater than 37 frontline staff, bin 3). Column 5 adds the number
of offices per district. Column 6 controls for the differential district size (number of offices)
in treated districts from the omission of PF offices by adding an interaction between
treatment status and the number of offices per district to this specification.
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Allowing for heterogeneity in the effect by the team size in columns 4-6 continue to show an
insignificant mean effect. Relative to offices in the middle of team size distribution, small
offices with few staff (in the bottom quartile) have significantly higher productivity but there
is an insignificant incentive effect in large offices (in the top quartile). The coefficient for
small offices translates into higher job entry productivity by 117 annual job entry points.
Thus the average incentivisation effect of zero masks a positive mean effect in small offices.
This effect is unchanged by controlling for both the number of offices per district (column 5)
and falls only slightly when including the interaction between number of offices and
incentivisation (column 6). The final row of Table 3 shows the p-value from a test for the
equality of slope coefficients for the interaction of incentivisation with office size bins 1-3,
indicating that we cannot reject significant heterogeneity in the incentive effect by team size
at the 10% level. This supports the idea that free-riding is easier to mitigate in small offices
by monitoring.
2829
3.2 Quality – Job-Seeker, Employer Service and Business Delivery
We adopt a similar approach to modelling quality outcomes. These are only measured
quarterly and at district level. This reduces the sample size from around 900 offices to just 90
districts.
30
In terms of performance in the scheme, all incentivized districts met the quality
target JSQ, 7 out of 17 districts met BDT target and 6 out of 17 met the EMQ target.
Columns 1-3 of Table 4 show the results for the district annual averages for JSQ, EMQ and
BDT. Regional fixed effects are included in all regressions. Few variables are estimated to
have a significant effect, due in part to the small number of observations and a lack of
variation in the outcomes and in the case of JSQ the targets possibly having been set too low.
28
We tested the robustness of these results to a change of the dependent variable to standardised log
productivity to have mean 0 standard deviation 1 and standardised level of productivity. The size effects persist
with the coefficient on incentivisation interacted with staff in bin 1 equal to 0.47 (0.49) and with staff in bin 3
equal to 0.26 (0.24) for standardised log (level) productivity. The corresponding standard errors are 0.23 (0.34)
and 0.24 (0.14).
29
We repeated the regression of Table 3 column 6 including PF offices to test for the sensitivity of our results to
our choice to exclude these offices. The coefficient on the interaction term between treatment and staff in bin 1
and 3 changed to 0.27 and 0.09 respectively with standard errors 0.12 and 0.09, hence our conclusions did not
change. In addition we ran a regression dropping Jobcentre Plus offices (offices that during the scheme became
designated as pathfinder offices, predominantly in the final 2 months of the incentive scheme). The interaction
between treatment and staff in bin 1 falls to 0.10 and is no longer statistically significant (standard error of 0.19)
and the coefficient on the interaction of treatment and staff in bin 3 is very similar at 0.15 with standard error of
0.19. Only offices in incentivised districts were JCP offices and about half of the incentivsed offices were JCP,
hence dropping these considerably reduces variation in the treatment status.
30
We only received BDT data for 89 offices.
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Similarly to above, an increase in the number of staff reduces productivity at an increasing
rate. This may arise from a more personal service in smaller offices. For all quality measures
the tightness of the labour market has a negative impact, the magnitude of which is largest for
EMQ. This is intuitive, as a tight labour market means a difficult time for employers to fill
vacancies. Importantly for our analysis, there is no significant impact of any term involving
incentivisation status within small offices. There is a significant negative effect of
incentivisation in large offices for JSQ, however the test of equality of slope coefficients
cannot reject that the interactions of treatment with the three office size bins are equal to zero.
This lack of significant effect of incentivisation on quality outcomes can be taken in two
different ways. On one hand, it could be argued that the scheme failed to elicit any increase
due to design issues. The most obvious are the low precision of measurement and monitoring
technology for quality. The theory says that low precision of measurement should lead
workers to exert less extra effort on these tasks. Poor monitoring might make workers expect
that any slack on effort would not be detected. Other explanations are that the targets were
too low (but this is not supported by the fact that many districts did not hit the BDT and EMQ
targets) or that the incentive payments were too low (but the fact that hitting all 5 targets
represented between 7.5% to 8.5% of average pay and hitting 5 targets rather than 3 meant
more than a doubling of the incentive payment does not support this). On the other hand, the
failure of the scheme to have any effect on quality could be viewed more positively - as
showing that despite the greater effort on quantity, quality did not actually fall, a standard
failing of many incentive schemes. This may have been due to the fact that quality measures
were explicitly part of the scheme and focusing only on the quantity target was not an option
as the bonus payment was conditional on reaching at least two targets.
3.3 Quantity and Quality Together
We argue the contrast between the significant effect of the scheme on quantity and lack of
effect arises partly from the differing measurement precision for quantity and quality. But it
may simply be statistical as we have 90 observations (districts) in one case and over 800
(offices) in the other. We address this by re-running the quantity regression at district level
using log district annual job entry productivity as the dependent variable. The results are in
Column 4 of Table 4. There is a positive but insignificant impact of incentivisation on
quantity, which increases in small offices. Again, we reject the hypothesis that the slope
coefficients for the interaction between treatment and office size bins 1-3 are equal to zero at
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the 10% level. This suggests that the differences between quantity and quality results are not
due to size of the sample, but there is something different about the behavioural response to
the quantity and quality targets.
It could be argued that since time allocated to quantity and quality is determined jointly, good
performance on one will mean poor performance on the other. We therefore examine whether
good performance on one dimension is positively or negatively correlated with good
performance on the other. In fact, we find little correlation between quantity and quality, and
a positive correlation between quality measures except EMQ and BDT
31
. If we take EMQ as
more useful a measure (given the low variation in JSQ and BDT), there is a very low
association
32
. Therefore we do not think that the results arise because time spent on quantity
reduces the amount of time to achieve quality, but instead arise because of differences in
measurement precision which means that aggregate output is much less related to individual
productivity. These findings also have support from Gaynor and Pauly (1990) who showed
that aggregate output was significantly higher in medical practices in which compensation
was more closely related to individual productivity. In their context there is no joint
production, as the organisation output is the number of office visits per week, observable at
physician’s level. So linking compensation to output is more effective. In our case we only
have joint measures for output, and, for the quality measures, these are available only at
district level, probably too weakly linked to individual productivity to be effective.
4. Valuing the impact of the incentive scheme
The mean effect of the scheme is zero. So across all offices in the scheme there were no
gains. However, our estimates show that for small offices there were increases in quantity
following the scheme. In this section, we ask the question if the scheme were to be introduced
in the appropriate settings i.e. in small offices, what value might it have?
We can evaluate the quantitative importance of the change in the quantity outcome in two
ways. First we compare the number of people placed into jobs with the monetary cost of the
31
The correlation of average annual job entry productivity with JSQ, EMQ and BDT is 0.20, 0.13 and 0.24,
between JSQ and EMQ and BDT is 0.38 and 0.49 and between EMQ and BDT is -0.041.
32
We also estimate the district level annual quantity and EMQ models jointly using SUR, but as we would
expect from the low correlation found above, there is only a small change in the standard errors.
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scheme, thereby calculating the cost per placement. Second, we compare the benefits of the
incentive scheme to the option of hiring more staff.
4.1 The cost per placement
Given the estimates in Table 3, column 6, we can straightforwardly calculate the distribution
of change in job entry productivity associated with the incentive scheme. The fitted value
from the regression is calculated using only variables related to treatment (the treatment
effect itself plus any interactions), translated into job entry points then converted into a
proportion of total job entry points for the treated office. Since the impact varies according
to office size, we report this percentage change across the distribution as well as the mean in
Table 5. As would be expected from Table 3 column 2, the overall effect of incentivisation is
small at -0.169%. There is a substantial positive effect in small offices which declines across
office size.
The mean percentage increase in small offices is 21%. A 21% change in job entry
productivity translates to 19,979 job entry points. This is derived by calculating 21% of total
job entry points relative to total staff for small, incentivized districts, multiplied by total staff
in the small incentivized districts to give the total number of points. To convert points into
people, we use Appendix Table W3 and normalise by the average points per job entry
placement as 5.4 which gives 3,700 extra people. The ex post cost of the job entry component
of the scheme was around £272,100. We estimate this from the data on the payments made
for 5 of the 17 districts hitting their job entry target and earning 1% of salary (allowing for
different numbers of staff). The figure is equivalent to 0.21% of the salary bill for the 17
incentivized districts. All 5 who hit were small districts. Consequently, in the best case
scenario of targeting the incentive scheme towards small districts, the scheme cost £74 per
job placement, a trivial amount.
4.2 Incentive Scheme versus Hiring More Staff
This can be compared with the option of hiring more staff. We ask how many staff would be
needed to produce the additional 19,979 job entry points induced through the scheme. Mean
productivity or job entry points per worker in the small, incentivized offices was 272.3
meaning that 73 extra staff members would be required to achieve the same effect of the
incentive scheme. The average salary for EO and AO workers in 2002 was £15,515 and
therefore the cost of hiring 73 more frontline staff would be £1,132,595 which is over 4 times
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larger than the cost of the incentive scheme. The cost of the incentive scheme could
hypothetically increase significantly from our estimate and still the incentive scheme would
be considerably more cost effective than the option of hiring more staff.
5. Conclusions
There is little robust evidence on the role and impact of performance pay in the public sector,
even though this is a sector that employs as many people in the UK and US as manufacturing
does. This paper helps to start filling that gap by providing an evaluation of a pilot pay for
performance scheme in a major UK government agency, Jobcentre Plus. The incentive
scheme was based on team, rather than individual, performance and covered five different
targets, measured with varying degrees of precision. We offer three main results: on the basic
question of the efficacy of performance pay for public service workers; on the implications of
the team basis of the scheme; and the implications of the explicit multiple targets including
quality as well as quantity.
We show that the use of performance pay had no effect on average on the quantity measure
(job placement productivity), but that there was important heterogeneity of response. The
heterogeneity was patterned as one might expect from a free rider versus peer monitoring
perspective. We found that the incentives had a substantial positive effect in small offices. In
large offices, there was a negligible effect. Our interpretation of this is that peer monitoring
and better information flows were able to overcome free rider problems in small units, but not
in large teams.
The impact of performance pay on quantity was not matched by any impact on quality
measures. Our interpretation of this finding is that individuals responded optimally to the
scheme by focusing their effort on the better-measured quantity outcome rather than quality.
It seems likely that the main aim of the incentive scheme was to raise quantity, and the
introduction of quality targets was to mitigate or prevent declines in quality rather than in the
expectation of improvements in quality and this proved successful.
There are, of course, a number of caveats we need to note. First, the scheme only operated for
one year and so the responses may include a “first year” novelty effect in addition to the pure
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incentive effect. Furthermore, if a ‘ratchet’ design of continual percentage improvements
were repeated in a dynamic setting, the optimal response would be different to the response
from a once-only pilot. Second, the outcome could be the result of performance management
per se, rather than the financial reward attached. However, this is unlikely. The same
performance management system was in place everywhere, in both control and treated
offices. It may be that the financial incentives led managers to take the existing framework
more seriously but that is surely part of the aim of performance pay. Third, given the specific
structure of the agency and the incentive scheme, it is possible to question the external
validity of this study, but there is little evidence on the use of incentive schemes in the public
sector with which to compare our findings.
33
While there is more evidence for the private
sector, the differences between the sectors mean that schemes in the two sectors are
sufficiently different to limit comparison.
34
Fourth, our identification strategy removes
Pathfinder offices from the evaluation sample, These offices were not selected on a
productivity basis, but rather given their ability to cope well with the new structure of
Jobcentre Plus. If however the selection criteria was correlated with productivity, then
dropping the most productive offices from incentivized districts may produce a lower bound
on the treatment effect. We think that the quantitative impact would be second order at best,
as there were a substantial number of offices in each district so removing one could only have
a trivial effect.
35
Finally, we draw some tentative conclusions for the design of team-based performance pay
schemes in the public sector. These relate to both incentive scheme design and organisational
design. One key lesson is that designing a sensible performance pay system in the public
sector is difficult. A common problem is the strongly hierarchical structure often present and
the resulting difficulty of attributing outcomes across different levels. One way forward
33
One notable exception is the experimentation with various forms of performance related pay in the JTPA
schemes in the USA but these did not have the same design features which allowed examination of free-riding.
For example Heckman et al. 1996 examined the prevalence of cream-skimming and Courty and Marschke, 1997
found bureaucrats to manipulate the date of reporting outcomes of participants to maximise own bonus
payments.
34
For example, Bandiera et al. 2005, 2007, 2009 run a field experiment in a private firm and consider the impact
of relative incentives versus individual incentives on workers’ productivity and on managers incentives to select
workers. In the public organization we consider, the scheme designers wanted to promote cooperation across
workers, so that the use of relative performance evaluation, which puts workers in competition to each other,
would have not been considered. It is also more likely that in a public organisation there is more pressure from
unions to use group performance evaluation rather than individual performance evaluation.
35
If we exclude the largest office from non-incentivized districts for example, mean job entry productivity only
changes by 3.7%. This compares to a standard deviation in office job entry productivity which is 170% of the
mean.
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would be to explicitly recognise that different levels of performance are all valued and to
offer incentives as a weighted function of individual-, group-, and organization-level
performance as is common in the private sector
36
. Another option of course is to measure all
outputs at the most disaggregated level although this may be a costly solution. We have
shown that the scheme was very cost-effective in small offices, despite not being particularly
high powered (in contrast, for example, to Kahn et al. 2001). Ideally then team size needs to
be small and preferably not dispersed over many sites, and the connection between effort and
output needs to be as clear and well-measured as possible. The argument of Dewatripont,
Jewitt and Tirole (1999) about organisational design around missions can be adapted here. If
incentives are indeed a cost-effective way of inducing greater output given the right team
size, then it may make sense to re-structure organisations to create natural teams of the
appropriate size. Such re-structuring could also allow for relative performance evaluation to
filter away common uncertainty and fits well with the general movement towards devolved
agency inherent in many current public service reforms.
36
We thank a referee for this suggestion.
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Table 1: Characteristics of the districts and offices by incentive status
(a) Districts
%
Pathfinder
Office
Frontline
Staff
Mean Labour
Market
Conditions
Private Public
Wage Gap
Number of
Offices in
District
Non- Mean 268.38 1.29 -0.27 11.14
Incentivized
Districts
Median 235 1.23 -0.85 11
Incentivized
Districts
Mean 11.84 424.82 1.18 -0.21 14.54
Median 11.77 405 1.14 -0.77 13.25
Incentivized
Districts, excluding
PF offices
Mean 11.84 242.08 1.20 -0.35 10.84
Median 11.77 204 1.21 -0.66 9
(b) Offices
Pathfinder
Office
Frontline
Staff
Mean Labour
Market
Conditions
Private Public
Wage Gap
Offices in Non- Mean 27.02 1.21 -0.21
Incentivized
Districts
Median 21 1.11 -0.77
Offices in Mean 0.22 32.01 1.18 -0.17
Incentivized
Districts
Median 0 24 1.13 -0.59
Non PF Offices in Mean 25.16 1.19 -0.17
Incentivized
Districts
Median 21 1.15 -0.68
Note: Frontline staff defined as the sum of Executive Officer and Administrative Officer. Labour market is defined as the ratio of
the inflow of unemployment claimants to the inflow of vacancies, by TTWA.
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Table 2: Balancing tests for Propensity Score Match Quality
Mean
%
reduction t-test
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias |bias| t p>|t|
Propensity Score Unmatched 0.24 0.13 63.70 7.38 0.00
Matched 0.24 0.23 3.30 94.90 0.19 0.85
Log Mean Frontline Staff Unmatched 2.93 3.01 -9.90 -0.91 0.36
Matched 2.93 3.07 -16.80 -70.20 -1.17 0.24
Office Frontline Staff Variance Unmatched 3.09 2.67 9.80 0.85 0.40
Matched 3.09 3.03 1.30 86.90 0.09 0.93
Office Frontline Staff Squared Unmatched 931.92 1455.20 -12.40 -0.90 0.37
Matched 931.92 1184.40 -6.00 51.70 -0.90 0.37
Frontline Staff * No. Offices Unmatched 332.33 336.80 -1.70 -0.15 0.88
Matched 332.33 399.06 -24.80 -1393.40 -1.71 0.09
Office Log Mean Labour Market Unmatched 0.08 0.13 -16.90 -1.46 0.14
Matched 0.08 0.11 -8.40 50.50 -0.67 0.51
Office Labour Market Variance Unmatched 0.29 0.33 -23.70 -1.93 0.05
Matched 0.29 0.30 -5.70 76.10 -0.49 0.62
Labour Market * Frontline Staff Unmatched 27.55 31.81 -17.30 -1.48 0.14
Matched 27.55 31.35 -15.50 10.70 -1.28 0.20
No. Offices per District Unmatched 13.44 12.67 19.40 1.74 0.08
Matched 13.44 14.06 -15.50 20.20 -1.07 0.29
No. Offices per District Squared Unmatched 194.16 178.58 14.10 1.29 0.20
Matched 194.16 217.17 -20.80 -47.60 -1.40 0.16
Proportion of High Grade Staff Unmatched 0.03 0.03 -2.10 -0.20 0.84
Matched 0.03 0.03 -1.10 46.60 -0.08 0.93
Private Public Wage Gap Unmatched 0.24 -0.13 13.90 1.42 0.16
Matched 0.24 -0.47 26.90 -93.80 1.85 0.07
Note: Offices included in analysis contributed towards job entry outcome, but were non Pathfinder offices. Mean labour market is
defined as the monthly ratio of the inflow of unemployment claimants to the inflow of vacancies, by TTWA, averaged within
offices across time. Mean frontline staff defined as the sum of Executive Officer and Administrative Officer, averaged within
offices across time. The t-test and p-value are reported for the test of equality of means in treated and control observations.
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Table 3: Office Annual Job Entry Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
District Office 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06
(0.063) (0.087) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080)
JCP Office 0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05
(0.098) (0.128) (0.117) (0.118) (0.119) (0.120)
Private Public Wage Gap -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Log Mean Labour Market 0.09 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.061) (0.081) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Incentivisation Status 0.09 -0.01 -0.17 -0.17 0.16
(0.095) (0.087) (0.106) (0.107) (0.292)
Mean Office Frontline Staff/100 -1.50*** -1.49*** -1.49*** -1.48***
(0.134) (0.138) (0.140) (0.140)
Mean Office Frontline Staff/100
Squared 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Incentivisation * Mean Frontline Staff 0.35** 0.35** 0.30**
Bin 1 (12 staff) (0.140) (0.142) (0.147)
Incentivisation * Mean Frontline Staff 0.21 0.21 0.17
Bin 3 (37 staff) (0.149) (0.149) (0.153)
No. Offices Per District 0.00 0.00
(0.006) (0.006)
Incentivisation * No. Offices Per -0.02
District (0.018)
Constant 5.48*** 5.48*** 5.86*** 5.86*** 5.84*** 5.82***
(0.032) (0.093) (0.091) (0.091) (0.112) (0.113)
Observations 841 841 841 841 841 841
R-squared 0.077 0.078 0.234 0.240 0.240 0.241
P-value for Test Equality Slope
Coefficients 0.089 0.086 0.060
Note: standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable: Log
Office Productivity. Office Productivity is defined as log of the ratio of total JE points to total frontline staff. Pathfinder offices
were omitted from analysis. All regressions control for regional fixed effects. The district office indicates the head office. JCP
status is a dummy variable equal to one if the offices within incentivized districts were given the new JCP status during the
incentive scheme and 0 otherwise. The private public wage gap is defined as the relative hourly wage differential within Local
Authorities. Mean labour market is defined as the monthly ratio of the inflow of unemployment claimants to the inflow of
vacancies, by TTWA, averaged within offices across time. Mean frontline staff defined as the sum of Executive Officer and
Administrative Officer, averaged within offices across time. Bin 1 of staff is less than 12, bin 3 is greater than 37 (25
th
and 75
th
percentile respectively). Regressions are clustered at the district level.
31
Table 4: District annual JSQ, EMQ, BDT and JE analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
JSQ EMQ BDT JE
% PF offices per District 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.088)
% JCP offices per District -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.029)
Private Public Wage Gap -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.02
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.026)
Mean District Frontline Staff/100 -0.12* -0.19** 0.05 -1.74**
(0.064) (0.078) (0.058) (0.756)
Mean District Frontline Staff/100 Squared 0.08 0.16** -0.03 0.74
(0.055) (0.067) (0.045) (0.616)
Log Mean District Labour Market -0.03* -0.06*** -0.01 -0.10
(0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.157)
Incentivisation Status -0.02 0.11 0.09 0.70
(0.054) (0.080) (0.063) (1.099)
Incentivisation * Mean District Frontline Staff Bin 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.30**
1 (12 staff) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.141)
Incentivisation * Mean District Frontline Staff Bin -0.02** 0.01 -0.01 0.09
3 (37 staff) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.130)
No. Offices per District 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.01
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Incentivisation * No. Offices per District -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013)
Constant -0.12*** -0.01 -0.08** 3.46***
(0.044) (0.052) (0.036) (0.457)
Observations 90 90 89 90
R-squared 0.663 0.435 0.587 0.688
P-value for Test Equality Slope Coefficients 0.167 0.446 0.109 0.086
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. JSQ is the job seekers
service, EMQ the employer quality outcome, BDT business delivery target and JE job entries. Dependent variables are log annual
district average JSQ, log annual district average EMQ, log annual district average BDT and log productivity of JE. All regressions
include regional fixed effects. PF denotes the Pathfinder Office created prior to the incentive scheme. JCP status is a dummy
variable which equals one if the offices within incentivized districts were given the new JCP status during the incentive scheme
and 0 otherwise. The private public wage gap is defined as the relative hourly wage differential within Local Authorities. Mean
frontline staff defined as the sum of Executive Officer and Administrative Officer, averaged within offices across time. Mean
labour market is defined as the monthly ratio of the inflow of unemployment claimants to the inflow of vacancies, by TTWA,
averaged within offices across time. Bin 1 of staff is less than 12, bin 3 is greater than 37 (25
th
and 75
th
percentile respectively).
Regressions are clustered at the district level.
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Table 5: Mean Incentivisation Effect
Number of frontline staff per office, by bin for office size
<=12 staff 12-37 staff >=37 staff Mean
21.431 -15.219 5.361 -0.169
Note: The incentivisation effect for incentivized offices was calculated using the fitted value from Table 3, column 5, using the
variables incentivisation status and an interaction of this with office size and district size.
Appendix
Table A1: Data Descriptives
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Total Between Within
Office Level Variables
Office Monthly Job Entry Points 512.893 458.300 458.300 183.384
Office Pathfinder Status 0.054 0.226 0.224 0.000
Office JCP Status 0.062 0.241 0.256 0.030
District Office 0.056 0.229 0.244 0.000
Private Public Wage Gap -0.550 2.417 2.382 0.000
Log Office Frontline Staff 3.085 0.856 0.857 0.197
Office Frontline Staff Variance 4.503 6.394 6.163 0.000
Log Office Labour Market 0.091 0.441 0.311 0.312
Incentivisation Status 0.241 0.428 0.426 0.000
Office Mean % High Grade Staff 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.000
Labour Market Time Series Variation 0.262 0.057 0.057 0.000
District Level Variables
Log District Annual Job Entry Points 13.818 0.359 0.361 0.000
Log District EMQ -0.146 0.044 0.027 0.034
Log District JSQ -0.170 0.035 0.028 0.022
Log District BDT -0.074 0.026 0.025 0.009
% PF Offices per District 2.535 4.941 4.659 1.131
% JCP Offices per District 0.005 0.022 0.016 0.017
Log District Mean Frontline Staff 8.357 0.462 0.451 0.000
Log District Labour Market 0.130 0.353 0.217 0.285
No. Offices per District 11.647 3.981 4.265 0.000
M * No. Offices per District 3.456 6.608 6.603 0.000
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Table A2: Propensity score probit estimates of Incentivisation Status
Mean Frontline Staff -0.265*
(0.149)
Office Frontline Staff Variance -0.004
(0.014)
Office Frontline Staff Squared -0.000*
(0.000)
Frontline Staff * No. Offices 0.001
(0.001)
Office Mean Labour Market 0.502
(0.394)
Office Labour Market Variance -0.706
(0.541)
Labour Market * Frontline Staff 0.008
(0.009)
No. Offices per District -0.660***
(0.086)
No. Offices per District Squared 0.028***
(0.003)
Proportion of High Grade Staff 0.605
(2.134)
Private Public Wage Gap 0.014
(0.039)
Regional Variables
East of England 0.020
(0.369)
London 0.913**
(0.407)
North East 0.243
(0.468)
North West 0.817**
(0.345)
Office for Scotland 0.842**
(0.337)
Office for Wales 0.482
(0.361)
South East -3.608***
(0.529)
South West -0.481
(0.395)
West Midlands 0.681*
(0.353)
Yorkshire -0.124
(0.408)
Constant 2.394***
(0.751)
Observations 912
Psuedo R
2
= 0.2813
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Note: the predicted value
forms the propensity score used for the office level quantity analysis. Offices included in analysis contributed towards job entry
outcome, but were non Pathfinder offices. Labour market is defined as the ratio of the inflow of unemployment claimants to the
inflow of vacancies, by TTWA. Mean frontline staff defined as the sum of Executive Officer and Administrative Officer,
averaged within offices across time.
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Table A3: Propensity Matching Results
Sample on support Average Treatment of the Treated
841 0.002
(0.085)
Note: Outcome is log job entry productivity per office. This is calculated as the log of total office job entry points per staff.
Pathfinder offices are omitted from analysis. Kernel weighted propensity score matching with an Epanechnikov kernel.
Bootstrapped standard error in parentheses, with 100 replications
